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JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-20'). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
All of the issues presented in this appeal involve questions of law concerning 
the interpretation of certified court dockets, the interpretation of Utah Statutes, the 
interpretation of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and the interpretation of 
unambiguous loan documents, and therefore all issues before this Court are subject to 
de novo review under a correction-of-error standard without deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. See Sanders v. Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah 1992); 
State v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); Russell v. Standard 
Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995). 
ISSUES 
I. Is the District Court divested of jurisdiction over a judgment made in 
case while the judgment and the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals with respect 
thereto are under appellate review by the Utah Supreme Court? 
II. Did the Judgment Creditor (i.e., Eugene Horbach — Appellant's 
predecessor in interest) timely file his petition for certiorari with the Utah Supreme 
Court from the adverse decision of the Utah Court of Appeals which reversed the 
Judgment of the District Court? 
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III. Did the sending of the record on appeal by the clerk of the Utah Court of 
Appeals to the District Court re-convey jurisdiction on the District Court and divest 
the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction even though the Utah Supreme Court 
granted the Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari, which resulted in the 
affirmance of the District Court's Judgment, and a reversal of the Court of Appeals' 
opinion? 
IV. Did the opinion of the Court of Appeals operate to vacate the District 
Court's Judgment without further action by the District Court even though the opinion 
remands the case to the District Court for further action? 
V. If this Court decides that the actions taken by the clerk of the Court of 
Appeals operated to vacate the District Court's Judgment notwithstanding this Court's 
timely decision to review the opinion of the Court of Appeals, did this Court's reversal 
of the opinion of the Court of Appeals and affirmance of the Judgment of the District 
Court reinstate nunc pro tunc the District Court's Judgment against a third party who 
took a security interest in the Judgment Debtor's property with notice that the 
Judgment Creditor's Judgment was still of record and pending review by the Utah 
Supreme Court? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
78-2-2. Supreme Court Jurisdiction 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
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interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; ] 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of 
Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0), (4) & (5). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 provides that u[t]he Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: . . . (i) cases transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court." {Id.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This Case involves a dispute between the Appellant, the successor in interest to 
the Judgment Creditor, and the Appellees concerning their respective interests in real 
property situated in Salt Lake County, Utah. Appellant sought to enforce its judgment 
lien on the Judgment Debtor's real property by a writ of execution issued pursuant to 
Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Judgment Creditor's Judgment was 
appealed by the Judgment Debtor. After ruling on part of the case, this Court 
transferred appellate jurisdiction to the Utah Court of Appeals to review the remaining 
part of the case. After reviewing the remainder of the case, the Utah Court of Appeals 
made its written opinion which sought to reverse the District Court's Judgment. The 
Judgment Creditor timely filed a petition for certiorari with this Court for review of the 
Court of Appeals' opinion. This Court granted the Judgment Creditor's petition for 
certiorari and upon review, reversed the Court of Appeals' opinion and affirmed the 
Judgment of the District Court in a published decision. Notwithstanding this Court's 
decision, which affirmed the District Court's Judgment, District Court Judge Stephen 
L. Henriod ruled that the Judgment is not enforceable against the Judgment Debtor's 
property because the Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari was filed after the 30-
4 
day period for the filing of the petition and after the clerk of the Court of Appeals 
remitted the record to the District Court. Based thereon, Judge Henriod declared that 
Appellant's initial judgment lien was lost and permanently enjoined Appellant from 
enforcing its Judgment against the subject property. Appellant contends that the 
Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari was timely filed within the 30-day period 
because the 30th day fell on a Sunday, thereby extending the 30-day period to the 
following Monday as provided by Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Appellant also contends that the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is 
established by statute — not by the actions of the clerk of the Court of Appeals, and 
that the District Court was divested of jurisdiction over the Judgment made in the case 
until the Supreme Court had concluded its review of the Judgment and the opinion of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the District Court 
A writ of execution was issued by the Third District Court pursuant to Rule 69 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to foreclose Appellant's judgment lien on a 
parcel of property in Salt Lake County. A few days before the Sheriffs execution 
sale, Appellees filed a separate action in the Third District Court (i.e., the present 
action) wherein they asserted that the Court should enjoin the Sheriffs sale. On 
November 19, 2001, Judge Henriod issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the 
Sheriffs sale. Thereafter, Judge Henriod ruled that because the Judgment Creditor 
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had not timely filed its petition for certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court in the 
underlying action, Appellant's judgment, which had been affirmed by the Utah 
Supreme Court, was unenforceable. Appellant immediately moved to the District 
Court to alter and amend its ruling because the certified docket of the Utah Supreme 
Court reflects that the petition for certiorari, which was granted by the Utah Supreme 
Court, was timely filed. Judge Henriod refused to grant Appellant's motion. 
Thereafter, he made and entered a final judgment holding that Appellant's Judgment 
and the lien which arose thereunder were not enforceable against the property. He also 
permanently enjoined Appellant and the Sheriff from further execution on the 
property. Appellant asserts that Judge Henriod5s memorandum decision is 
inconsistent with the certified dockets of the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Court of 
Appeals and the District Court. Appellant has filed this appeal seeking to have Judge 
Henriod's final judgment reversed so Appellant and the Sheriff of Salt Lake County 
may complete the execution sale of the subject property. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Appellant's predecessor, Eugene Horbach (referred to herein as the 
"Judgment Creditor"), obtained a money judgment (the "Judgment") against Lan C. 
England, who is referred to herein as the "Judgment Debtor", in the matter of England 
v. Horbach, Civil No. 930901471CV, reported at 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1997). The 
Judgment Creditor's Judgment was thereafter assigned to Appellant. 
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2. A copy of the Judgment, certified by the clerk of the District Court in the 
matter of England v. Horbach, is attached as Exhibit G (4). 
3. A certified copy of the docket in the District Court for the 
aforementioned case is attached as Addendum Exhibit G (1). A copy of the District 
Court docket in the present case is attached as Exhibit A. 
4. It was undisputed that upon the signing and entry of the Judgment by the 
District Court, a judgment lien arose on all non-exempt real property of the Judgment 
Debtor located in Salt Lake County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1, including 
the property which is the subject of this action. (See Conclusions of Law, Exhibit N, 
paragraphs 13-14) 
5. An appeal from the District Court's Judgment was taken to the Utah 
Supreme Court. (Certified Docket of Supreme Court, Exhibit G (3), page 1.) 
6. After the Judgment Debtor's motion for summary disposition was denied 
by this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals. (See Court of Appeals 
Docket, pages 1-2). A certified copy of the appellate docket from the Utah Court of 
Appeals is attached hereto as Exhibit G (2). 
7. On October 19, 1995, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its written 
opinion which states in relevant part as follows: 
Because we conclude the trial court erred when it held the accord and 
satisfaction unenforceable for lack of consideration and because we 
All references to exhibits are to the Addendum Exhibits which have been submitted with 
Appellant's brief. 
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conclude the agreement was not founded upon a mutual mistake of fact, 
we reverse and remand for further action consistent with this 
opinion. 
England v. Horbach et al, 905 P.2d 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (see Exhibit G (5), page 
6) (emphasis added). 
8. On November 20, 1995, the Judgment Creditor (Appellant's 
predecessor) filed a petition for certiorari with the clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
(Supreme Court Docket, Exhibit G (3), page 1), and on that same day the Utah 
Supreme Court sent formal notice to the District Court giving notice that a petition for 
a writ of certiorari had been filed. (Id.) 
9. The formal notice of the petition for certiorari that was given by the Utah 
Supreme Court to the District Court was docketed on the District Court docket on 
November 20, 1995. (Certified District Court Docket, Exhibit G (1), page 18.) A 
certified copy of the foregoing notice is attached as Appellant's Exhibit G (6). 
10. At the time the foregoing notice was given by the Utah Supreme Court 
to the District Court, the "record on appeal" had not been remitted to the District Court 
by the Utah Court of Appeals. (See District Court Docket, Exhibit G (1), page 18.) 
11. At no time after the formal notice was given by the Utah Supreme Court 
of the pending petition for certiorari, did the District Court vacate, alter or amend the 
Judgment. (See District Docket, Exhibit G (1).) 
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12, On November 22, 1995, two days after the Utah Supreme Court gave 
formal notice of the pending petition for certiorari, the cleii -;\ - < . . >i \ vnls 
atten lpted to rei i lit tl le i ecoi d oi i appeal to tl ic District Com t. (See District Court 
Docket, Exhibit G (1), page 18.) 
13, On February 14, 1996, the I Mah Supreme Court gave formal notice to the 
[ )isli nl ( \nii1 111,11 11 h«nl tfnttth I.I" tin .lud;'t]ii nM 'ii ililni ^ pW i( m HI U n o i l 'h H Mh I .Si i' 
District Court Docket, Exhibii G {[).) A certified copy of the foregoing notice is 
attached as Exhibit G (7) 
1 - '-• • : w as i e c o r d e d . am* • * 
Debtor' rroneuy located in Salt Lake County, which is the subject of this action. A 
copy of the deed of trust is attached as Exhibit G (8). 
15. A> nivj iiiih. me loregoing det\; oi iri^t was recorder MUIIU;;; 
Cud i» i.-i . • • • -:\-!v.'* . !.aini io review by the Utah Supreme 
Court were reflected on the District (\mi t *•-. docket {See District Court Docket, 
Exhibit G ( l ) , page 18.) 
1 6 . O ' - - *"• '•- : •• ••• • . ! • : ; . .-
England v. liorbach matter. A copy of the published onmion is attached as Exhibit G 
(9). The decision of the Utah Supreme Court reversed ihe opu.ua: »»i \--, K - M 
A p - e - i - i " - • • • ' ) 
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17. On October 1, 1997, after all matters on appeal were concluded, the Utah 
Supreme Court remitted the record on appeal to the clerk of the District Court. {See 
Supreme Court Docket, Exhibit G (3), page 2; and District Court Docket, Exhibit G 
(1), page 18.) 
18. A certified copy of the remittitur document from the Utah Supreme 
Court to the District Court is attached as Exhibit G (10). 
19. Sometime in the year 2000, Scott Lundberg, as trustee, filed a notice of 
default under the deed of trust. (Exhibit G (11), page 1.) Thereafter, a non-judicial 
sale was conducted by the trustee whereat the trustee sold the subject property. 
(Exhibit G (11), page 2.) 
20. On December 28, 2000, Scott Lundberg executed a trustee's deed to the 
buyer at the sale which was recorded at the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on 
January 10, 2001. A copy of the deed is attached hereto as Exhibit G (11). 
21. The trustee's deed provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
NOW, THEREFORE, Trustee, in consideration of the premises recited 
and of the sum bid and paid by Grantee, by virtue of his authority under 
the Trust Deed, grants and conveys to the Grantee, without any covenant 
or warranty, express or implied, all of the property situated in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah . . . 
(Exhibit G (11), page 2) (emphasis added). 
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22. On September 28, 2001 , the Third District Court issued a writ of 
execution to the Sheriff ol Sail i ake ( 'nun!. on Apfu ILIIITS liiilnnuMil 11 )i >;lrn1 ( 'unit 
Docket, r * >ugc- i y.) 
23. On November 16, 2001, the Appellees filed their motion for temporary 
restraining order {see Exhibit >\) and memorandum oi ,<• *\\. - : t 
the". o \ (>'rr h *• \ 
24. On November 19, 2001 , Appellant filed its memorandum in opposition 
to the motion \ copy of Appellant's memorandum in opposition u> i ^ nioi*« a i-
an iv iico a^ r. -
25. On November 19, 2001 , Judge Henriod made and entered his Temporary 
Restraining Order. The Order restrained the Judgment Creditor and the Shen;: oi Salt 
Lake Couni\ i;om proceeding \\ ill i I he execution s.ilc <»f the pioperlv \ tvp \ ^I'llir 
Teinp< - ^ ; antlg Order is attached as Exhibit E. The Temporary Restraining 
Order provided for a hearing on December 3, 2001. 
26. In compliance wiiii \Dc in:»iiuj!:--n • . r*!.^ •,* "' : i 
si ibi i iitted a si ipplei i lei ital bi ief to the Court. Appellees ' brief is attached as Exhibit F, 
and Appellant 's brief is attached as Exhibit G. 
?~7. )ecember.: . .. nca:ing was L : .• .» 
- r- .».• .
 ( ;.>; .;.„:•;;•.. ,\ii ' p - -deputed facts at issue, the parties 
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argued the legal issues before the Court. (See District Court Docket, Exhibit G (1), 
page 2.) 
28. After argument, Judge Henriod took the matter under advisement. Judge 
Henriod ordered that the Temporary Restraining Order would remain in effect pending 
his decision. {See Case Docket, Exhibit A, page 2.) 
29. On December 10, 2001, the District Court issued its written 
memorandum decision. A copy of the memorandum decision is attached as Exhibit H. 
In its memorandum decision, the Court concluded, in relevant part, as follows: 
In this case, on October 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a 
decision reversing and remanding the District Court's Order. Then, on 
November 22, 1995, more than thirty days after, the Court of Appeals 
remitted the case back to the District Court. Shortly thereafter, on 
November 24, 1995, defendant filed a petition for certiorari in the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
Based upon this sequence of events defendant contends that after 
remittitur the District Court did not obtain proper jurisdiction and 
consequently could [not] modify its judgment in accordance with the 
instructions of the Court of Appeals. However, defendant's petition for 
certiorari was only granted after the Court of Appeals sent the case back 
to the District Court and after the thirty-day waiting period had expired. 
Furthermore, as a matter of public policy. It was defendant who was in a 
better position to protect itself in this matter since defendant could have 
requested a stay of execution of judgment pending its petition. 
Thus, for purposes of priority, the relevant judgment's priority is 
to be determined from the date of reinstatement and does not relate back 
to the original judgment. Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 
1988). 
Memorandum Decision, Exhibit H, page 2. 
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30. On January 7, 2002, Appellant filed its motion to alter and amend the 
Court's memorandum decision. ^ mp* ^' • *' .\< i "* 
i i lotioi i was si ippoi ted b> a niei norandui i i of points and authorities, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit J. 
31 In its motion to amend, Appellant asserted inai h,c ceriiiied copu^ o- me 
dockrls i if (In; 1 llah Si i pi a in' I 'niiil I In I 'tali ( 'HIII I * .1 \ppc,il . ,h J l\\r 1 )istnrl I <mi I 
(which were all submitted and received by the Court at the hearing), established that 
the Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari was filed timely with the clerk of the 
Suprei l le Com 11 *ej or < • " tl :t.e attei i lpted i en littit i n of the re :oi d to the Disti ict Coi irt by 
the clerk of the Court ol Appeals , and before the 30-day per iod for the filing of 
peti t ions of certiorari had expired. (See Exhibi t J, pages 7-14.) Appel lan t also poin ted 
out that iiu i <v\ aecisum rehed ,.; * .. ; . \\u ; >i u\. . • .. i p ; . sd to a i lew ji idgn lent 
and ' .•;.." i:> • .^/r:--•:•.
 t>i me banicjJ: 'Hem on appeal by the 
Supreme Court . {Id.) Appel lant further indicated thai the certified docket of this 
Court and the undisputed loai I documents conclusively establish tl lat the security 
interest given b> tl le Ii idgi nei it Debtor to tl i, t tl in d part) lender occi irred after tl lis 
Court had granted the Judgment Credi tor ' s petition for certiorari and after this Cour t 
recorded its notice thereof \\ im \\w \ u^wwx x \mv\ ; /</ 
3On or about January 7, 2002, Appellees filed their memorandum in opposition thereto. A 
copy of the opposition memorandum is attached as Exhibit L. 
13 
32. Because the foregoing facts appeared clear from the certified dockets, 
Appellant sought leave to submit a proposed Declaratory Judgment to the Court. A 
copy of Appellant's motion and the attached [proposed] Declaratory Judgment are 
attached as Exhibit K. 
33. On January 30, 2001, the parties prepared and submitted a "Joint Notice 
to Submit and Request for Ruling and Entry of Final Judgment". A copy of the 
foregoing notice is attached as Exhibit M. 
34. On January 31, 2002, Judge Henriod signed the Final Judgment which 
was submitted by Appellees. A copy of the Final Judgment is attached as Exhibit O. 
Judge Henriod also signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by 
the Appellees. A copy of the findings and conclusions is attached as Exhibit N. 
35. On March 1, 2002, Appellant filed its Notice of Appeal of the District 
Court's Final Judgment, its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law and the denial of 
Appellant's motion to alter and amend. A copy of Appellant's Notice of Appeal is 
attached as Exhibit P. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The law is well settled that a trial court is divested of jurisdiction while a 
judgment is under advisement on appeal. As such, the Judgment Creditor's Judgment, 
which remained intact on the judgment docket, remained a valid judgment throughout 
the appellate process because the District Court never regained jurisdiction over the 
14 
Judgment until the appellate review of the Judgment had been completed by the Utah 
Supreme (\«iirr. 
II. The cei tified docket of the Utah Supreme Court reflects that the 
Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari was timely filed. Rule 22 of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure clearly provider thai vviien ttk uisi ua\ ^; AW ming period falls 
U : H , . : i-: . . } ! t \!: M.1. : '• -i «h iiie l u i l owing 
Monday. As such, the conclusion by the District Court that the petition for certiorari 
was not timely filed was clearly error. 
III. h .!;*.. ••:. • ' ' • " ' ' " ' ' •' ' 'Mil u as ItmHv lllrd 
and because the petition was granted by this Court, jurisdiction over the Judgment 
remained with this Court until it remitted the matter back to the District Court, 
IV. rJ .s, ^  i ourt granted tl le Ii idgn lei it Ci editc i 5s petitioi i for cei tiorai i loi ig 
W^ >' " ] . % ' ) -btor encumbered his property by granting a deed of trust 
thereon. Ilie certified dockets of the Supreme Court and the District Court 
conclusively cstai:ii ... . ... . . ..i<iment Creditor's petition u „TtiiM„.i \W -, . ? -. 
on (Vbi 11,11 '* I • i ,H)(i I he 1 I,S!I n1 (.'our t docket also reflects that the Supreme Court 
gave formal noti.ee of the writ of certiorari to the District Coin: t and that the notice was 
entered on the I ii>tnci v. ouu s docket rn I ani iau . , •••- :... . ,: . . _i; t i *. nu . 
Deed of: I t i ist < \ as execi ited c i 1I\ la,;; - 2 1 1996 ai id recoi ded oi i May 31, 1996 
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V. The mere fact that the clerk of the Court of Appeals may have 
prematurely remitted the record to the District Court did not operate to convey 
jurisdiction on the District Court over the Judgment before the Supreme Court 
completed its review thereof as concluded by the District Court. Indeed, Rule 1(d) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure may not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court. 
VI. The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals did not indicate that it was self 
executing without further action by the District Court. Rather, the opinion expressly 
states that wCwe reverse and remand for further action consistent with this opinion". As 
such, Appellees' argument that the opinion of the Court of Appeals was self-executing 
is inconsistent with that Court's ruling. Appropriately, Judge Frederick, (who was the 
Judge in the action in which the Judgement was entered,) took no further action on the 
Judgment until this Court had completed its review of the Judgment on appeal. 
VII. In the alternative, even if the Judgment Creditor's Judgment was vacated 
by the decision of the Court of Appeals, this Court affirmance of the Judgment caused 
the Judgment to be reinstated nunc pro tunc, which gave the Judgment Creditor's 
judgment lien priority over the security interest taken by the third party which had 
constructive notice that the Judgment Creditor's Judgment remained unaltered by the 
District Court, and that the Judgment was under review by the Supreme Court. 
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ARGUMEN I ' 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
WAS BASED UPON A CLEARLY ERRONEOl 
READING OF THE CERTIFIED COIJRT D O C K ^ ' S 
In its memorandum decision, dated December lu, 2U01, tlle District Court 
concluded as follows: 
In this case, on October 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a 
decision reversing and remanding the District Court's Order. Then, on 
November 22, 1995, more than thirty days after, the Court of Appeals 
remitted the case back to the District Court. Shortly thereafter, on 
November 24, 1995, defendant filed a petition for certiorari in the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
Based upon this sequence of events defendant contends thai . 
remittitur the District Court did not obtain proper jurisdiction and 
consequently could [not] modify its judgment in accordance with the 
instructions of the Court of Appeals. However, defendant's petition for 
certiorari was only granted after the Court of Appeals sent the case back 
to the District Court and after the thirty-day waiting period had expired . 
M e i i i o r a i i d i 11 i i D e • : i s i o i i, E x 1 i i b i 11 1, p a g e 2 
The District Cour t ' s memorandum decision was based upon the erroneous fact 
that me Judgment Creditor 's petition iui \WA O: certiorari was not. tin^-.. I-..*;;; ^ ;i:i 
this Coi n t I low ever, the cei tified docket of t! le I Itah Si lpreme Coi n: IL, \ I licl i1 * - as 
received at the hearing as Appellant's Exhibit G (3), coiiclusively reflects that the 
Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari was indeed timely filed. 
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Pursuant to Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a] petition for 
a writ of certiorari must be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within 30 days 
after the entry of the final decision by the Court of Appeals." Id, 
Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the manner in 
which the 30-day period is to be calculated. The Rule provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
(a) Computation of time. In computing any period of time prescribed 
by these rules, by an order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the 
day of the act, event, or default which the designated period of time 
begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period shall be 
included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which 
event the period extends until the end of the next day that is not a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
Utah R. App. P. 22(a) (emphasis added). Based upon the foregoing, when the last day 
for the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari falls on a Sunday, the last day of the 
thirty-day period shifts to the following Monday. 
In the instant case, the 30n day for the filing of the Judgment Creditor's petition 
for certiorari was November 19th. However, because that day was a Sunday, the last 
day of the 30-day period was Monday, November 20n. The certified docket of the 
Utah Supreme Court reflects that the Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari was 
indeed filed on November 20, 2001. {See Appellant's Exhibit G (3).) Based upon the 
foregoing, the petition for certiorari was timely filed within the 30-day period and the 
District Court's ruling was clear error. 
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The certified copy of the Supreme Court's docket reflects that the Supreme 
Court gi ai ited tl le Ji idgi i lent Ci editor's petitioi i foi * rt it :»f cer tiorari on I 'ebi i lai y 13, 
1996, (Supreme Cour t Docket , Exhibi t G (3) at 1.) ! h e docket of the District Court 
also reflects that a formal written notice was given to the District Court that the 
petition * ,r .,• . . * : i..i.;* , • " • "' *"\ 
(See District Court Docket at 18). A certified v^p\ o£ Llic notice was received at 
hearing by the Court as Appellant's Exhibit G (7). 
POINT II 
THE DIS I RICT COURT'S J INDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS ARE ALSO ERRONEOUS 
The District Court's conclusions of law are also in error for the following 
additional reasons. 
First, in I"1"1 <"\ l '^nlr ^o nl Hit" / /»//,) Rul(]\ o/ 'tppi'l/iffc /'i' tn 't'rfw'i slatnl iiiii 
relevant part, that in the Court of Appeals, "[t]he remittitur of the court shall issue 
immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari". 
/ < - , , • • • • • * • f 
certiorari is indeed granted, the record on appeal would be remitted to the Supreme 
Court. However, if no petition for certiorari were filed or granted, then the record 
would be ien11Ited h• Ih ' Jr.trii M 'nnl hi ' irl Kule ' H,T- .'mended In mrp1 Ira1"' 
reflect the state of the law: 
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(2) In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue 
immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ 
of certiorari. If a petition for writ of certiorari is timely filed, issuance of 
the remittitur by the Court of Appeals will automatically be stayed until 
the Supreme Court's disposition on the petition for writ of certiorari. If 
the Supreme Court denies the petition, the Court of Appeals shall issue 
its remittitur five days after entry of the order denying the petition. If the 
supreme Court grants the petition, jurisdiction of the appeal shall be 
transferred to the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals shall close 
its file and transfer the record on appeal, if any, to the Supreme Court 
Utah R. App. P. 36(2). The foregoing Rule conforms with case law that the District 
Court is divested of jurisdiction until the entire appeal process has been concluded. 
See Hi-Country Estates Home-Owners Association v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 
305 (Utah 1996); Accord, White v. State of Utah, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990) ("This 
court has long followed the general rule that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction 
over a case while it is under advisement on appeal.") As such, the District Court's 
conclusion that somehow the Judgment was effectively vacated because the record on 
appeal was inadvertently transferred by the clerk of the Court of Appeals to the 
District Court is contrary to law. 
Second, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly provides that the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure may not be constmed to extend or limit the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court. The rules provides that "[tjhese rules shall not be 
constructed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of 
appeals as established by law" (emphasis added). Utah R. App P. 1(d). As stated, 
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Utah law provides that the District Court remains divested of Jurisdiction over a 
judgment until the entire appeal process is completed. 
Third, concerning the stay of execution, England was the Judgment Debtor, not 
Appellant. As such, the Judgment Debtor was the party who would have sought a stay 
of execution at the trial level. Moreover, because the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
was remanding the case to the District Court so the Judgment could be vacated, there 
was no reason for the Judgment Debtor to obtain further stay. Appellant did not need 
to obtain a stay of its own Judgment, nor a stay of the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
because the opinion did not become operative until the case was remanded to the 
District Court and the Judgment vacated. However, as stated, the District Court was 
divested of jurisdiction over the Judgment until the Supreme Court had concluded its 
review of the Judgment. 
Fourth, a judgment lien arises by operation of law upon the entry of the 
Judgment, not by way of execution. Thus, a stay of execution would have no effect 
the creation of a Judgment lien which arises automatically by operation of law. 
POINT III 
THE JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S PETITION FOR A 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
WAS GRANTED LONG BEFORE THE DEED OF TRUST WAS 
RECORDED AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR'S PROPERTY 
The suggestion that Appellant was in a better position to protect itself because 
the loan against the property (which was eventually foreclosed) was made before the 
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Supreme Court granted its petition for certiorari is erroneous. The certified dockets of 
the Supreme Court and the District Court establish conclusively that the Judgment 
Creditor's petition for certiorari was granted on February 13, 1996. The District Court 
docket also reflects that formal notice of the writ of certiorari was given by the 
Supreme Court to the District Court and that the notice was entered on the District 
Court's docket on February 21, 1996. {See District Court Docket, (Exhibit G (1), page 
18.) However, the loan transaction on the property did not occur until May 24, 1996! 
{See Appellant's Exhibit G (8)). As such, Appellees and their predecessors took the 
property subject to the Appellant potential lien against the subject property. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S JUDGMENT LIEN HAS PRIORITY 
OVER APPELLEES5 INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
SUB-POINT A 
THE ISSUE IN THIS ACTION DOES NOT INVOLVE A RENEWAL JUDGMENT 
BUT A JUDGMENT THAT WAS AFFIRMED AND REINSTATED ON APPEAL 
In the second to last paragraph of its Memorandum Decision, the District Court 
states as follows: 
Thus, for purposes of priority, the relevant judgment's priority is 
to be determined from the date of reinstatement and does not relate back 
to the original judgment. Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 
1988). 
4
 At no time have Appellees argued or established that they were good faith purchasers for 
value. 
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Memorandum Decision at 2. The same conclusion is stated in paragraph 15 of the 
District Court's conclusions of law (see Exhibit O). A review of the Cox decision 
reflects that it is not applicable to instant case because the discussion in Cox involved 
the effect of a renewed or renewal judgment. A renewal judgment is a new judgment 
obtained in a new action when an aging judgment is sued upon. Indeed, this is the 
procedure by which judgments are renewed in this State. 
In Cox, a lien creditor attempted to renew his judgment lien after the debtor's 
bankruptcy case had discharged the debtor from personal liability on an aging 
judgment. In Cox, this Court upheld the trial court's conclusion that "since the 
bankruptcy discharged respondents' [the debtor's] personal liability on the judgment. . 
. neither the judgment nor the judgment lien could be renewed." Id. at 939 (emphasis 
added). The court made this conclusion because a "renewal judgment results in a new 
judgment" {Id.) and the creation of a new judgment requires that personal liability 
exist. Accordingly, when an action is filed to obtain a renewal judgment, that action 
results in a new judgment being entered in a new docket. Thus, this Court has held 
that the lien created by a renewal judgment will attach only from the date of its entry. 
Id. The instant action does not involve a renewed or renewal judgment but rather a 
judgment that was affirmed and reinstated by this Court on appeal. 
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SUB-POINT B 
THE JUDGMENT REMAINED 
VALID THROUGH THE APPELLATE PROCESS 
The Judgment made in favor of the Judgment Creditor in the case remained 
valid through the appeal process because the District Court never regained subject 
matter jurisdiction over the Judgment to alter or vacate it.5 The remittitur of the record 
does not control appellate Jurisdiction but rather appellate jurisdiction controls 
remittitur. For example, in Hi-Country Estates Home-Owners Association v. Foothills 
Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996), this Court stated: 
The Court of Appeals erred in remitting the case before the time to seek 
certiorari had expired under the rules and erred again when it refused to 
recall its erroneously issued remittitur. The judgment of the district 
court is void because that court had no jurisdiction to enter a 
judgment while the case was still pending in the appellate courts. 
The district court judgment is vacated as void. 
Id., at 307 (emphasis added). Accord, White v. State of Utah, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 
1990) ("This court has long followed the general rule that the trial court is divested of 
jurisdiction over a case while it is under advisement on appeal.") 
5
 The decision of the Court of Appeals is clear that the case was to be remanded with further 
action by the trial court (i.e., the vacation of the Judgment). 
6
 If this were not the case and the clerk of the Court of Appeals could control jurisdiction of 
this Court, then the clerk would be liable to Appellant for all damages which it will sustain as 
a result of the improper remittitur of the appellate record to the District Court. Obviously, this 
has never been the law. 
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SUB-POINT C 
EVEN HAD THE JUDGMENT BEEN VACATED (WHICH IT WASN'T), 
THE JUDGMENT WAS REINSTATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
When a judgment is "reinstated7" as opposed to being renewed, this Court has 
indicated that the original judgment should be revitalized and have the same force and 
effect as though the judgment were never set aside. See Hewitt v. General Tire and 
Rubber Co., 302 P.2d 712 (Utah 1956). In Hewitt, the jury had returned a verdict in 
favor of the appellant and on the following day, the clerk signed and entered a 
judgment on the jury verdict. Id. at 712. Thereafter, the trial court granted a motion 
for a directed verdict and set aside the jury verdict and entered a judgment in favor of 
the respondent. Id. Upon appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the judgment was 
reversed, and this Court ordered that the judgment of the trial court be set aside, and 
that the jury verdict be reinstated. Id. However, when the case was remanded to the 
trial court so that the judgment could be reinstated in favor of the appellant, the trial 
court only permitted interest on the judgment to accrue from the date this Court 
ordered the judgment reinstated, as opposed to the date that the original judgment on 
the jury verdict was entered. Id. As a result, the case went back to this Court on 
appeal wherein this Court held that the trial court had erred in permitting interest to 
accrue only from the date on which the order had been entered for the judgment to be 
reinstated. Id. at 713. In reaching this conclusion, this stated as follows: 
7
 "Reinstate, To place again in a former state or position; to restore, the judge reinstated the 
judgment that had been vacated." Black's Law Dictionary at 1290 (7th ed.) (emphasis added). 
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The court's order entering judgment for the defendant was in error and 
abortive, and when this court issued its mandate ordering the judgment 
for defendant vacated and the judgment on the verdict for plaintiff 
reinstated, it vitalized that judgment to the same extent and with the 
same force as though the trial court had never entered the abortive 
and erroneous judgment for defendant. 
Id. at 713 (emphasis added). 
This Court concluded that it could not see any good reason why the 
appellant should lose the interest that had accrued on its judgment just because 
the respondent had been able to convince the trial court to make an erroneous 
ruling. Likewise, in this case, Appellant should not lose the priority of its 
judgment lien, just because the Judgment Debtor was able to convince the 
Court of Appeals to render an opinion which was rejected and reversed by this 
Court. 
SUB-POINT D 
APPELLEES' PREDECESSOR TOOK THE 
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE JUDGMENT 
In its pleadings before the District Court, Appellees argue that the 
original loan against the property was made before the Supreme Court granted 
the Judgment Creditor's petition for certiorari. The argument had some 
persuasion on the Court's decision. However, the certified docket of the 
Supreme Court reflects that the Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 
13, 1996 {see Supreme Court Docket at 2), and that a formal notice from the 
Supreme Court to the District Court that the petition had been granted. The 
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loan transaction on the property did not occur until May 24, 1996. {See 
Appellant's Exhibit G (8)). Thus, when the loan transaction was made, the 
o 
lender knew that the loan might be subject to the Judgment. Indeed, at the 
very least the Judgment gave notice of the pending action, i.e., a lis pendens 
(Latin for "a pending law suit", Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.) at 942). As 
such, any person searching title to the property had constructive notice of the 
Judgment, that it was under review by the Supreme Court and that the Judgment 
may be affirmed on appeal. 
It is further compelling that Appellees obtained title to the subject 
property through a trustee's deed, arising from a foreclosure sale, which 
expressly stated that the property was being conveyed without any warranty on 
December 28, 2000, several years after the Judgment had been reinstated by 
this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is clear that the District Court's Final 
Judgment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made in support thereof, 
are based upon numerous conclusions which are clearly erroneous and contrary to law. 
o 
"From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit court is docketed and filed in the 
office of the clerk of the district court of the county it becomes a lien upon all the real 
property of the judgment debtor, not except from execution, in the county in which the 
judgment is entered . .." Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1995) (while the statute was amended 
in 1997, the foregoing remained the law for all judgments made before July 1, 1997). See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1(2) (2001). 
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WHEREFORE, Appellant prays this honorable Court to reverse the Final 
Judgment of the District Court and to make an order declaring that Appellant's 
judgment lien against the subject property is indeed enforceable aad ordering further 
that the injunction entered against Appellant and the Sheriff of Salt Lake County be 
dissolved so the Sheriff may proceed with the execution sale of the subject property in 
compliance with Rule 69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Respectfully submitted this Q^t day of March, 2001. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Steven W. Call 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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